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C h a p t e r  3
J . B. S. Haldane, Holism, and Synthesis  in 
Evolution
Andy Hammond
John Burdon Sanderson Haldane (1892–1964), one of the leading biologists engaged 
in early genetics research, remains an anomaly. Forty-five years after his death, Hal-
dane (also referred to herein by his initials, J. B. S.) still is the least studied of the four 
principal mathematical population geneticists of the evolutionary synthesis.1 Beyond 
his biographers, few scholars offer more than a passing nod to Haldane’s research or 
his influence upon others.2 Most frustrating, individual pieces of his work normally are 
studied in isolation, without reference to the comprehensive whole of this remarkably 
complex thinker.
Everyone struggles with Haldane. The lack of easy handles certainly has a role in 
this struggle. So too do his many changes in position on fundamental issues. At times, 
Haldane was an idealist; at other times, a materialist. For a considerable time he was 
a Marxist, yet this seemingly overlapped with an increasing interest in Hinduism. 
Haldane also presented different identities to different audiences. Notably, he often 
restricted philosophical comments and speculations to popular and mass audience 
writings.3 A scholar reading his technical publications has only a partial view of Hal-
dane no matter how thorough his or her examination might be.
Another source of confusion about Haldane involves his commitment to holism.4 
This point is key. Haldane’s commitment to holism was a key motivation in his research 
and intellectual activity, as I argue in this paper. It also motivated his interest in syn-
thesis, both in evolution and in other realms of biology. Throughout his various shifts 
in philosophical position, Haldane remained committed to the principle of holism. 
Holism proved particularly key for Haldane during the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
when he struggled to embed genetics within a broader vision of evolution and then 
within a broader vision of biology. Haldane’s motivations might have been unique 
among advocates of synthesis in evolutionary studies. Nevertheless, his participation 
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added important momentum and material to a growing convergence of interest, the 
set of “common problems” so fundamental to the new generation of research in this 
area (Cain, 1993).
Haldane’s commitment to synthesis in evolution forms only part of a much wider 
ranging commitment to synthesis within his science and his world outlook in gen-
eral. This theme often is overlooked or belittled. Some scholars commenting on Hal-
dane’s science make passing reference to Haldane’s preference for a multidisciplinary 
approach or multifarious interests. Only two have attempted analysis in any depth 
(Sarkar, 1992b; Shapiro, 1993). Bartlett (1968, pp. 208–209) comes near to an 
explicit statement of Haldane’s antireductionism.5 Even Sheehan and Graham, who 
correctly emphasize the importance of philosophical motivations in Haldane’s sci-
ence, have not examined the connections between Haldane’s philosophy and science 
in depth and detail (Graham, 1973, p. 264; Sheehan, 1985, pp. 316–326). Yet the 
question of how Haldane’s philosophy and science interacted needs to be seriously 
addressed before we reach a solid understanding of Haldane and his work. This paper 
is an attempt to give a broad outline to such a project.
This paper follows Haldane through the first three decades of his career, from his 
physiological work in the early 1920s and through his biochemical research and inter-
est in population genetics during the interwar years. It also offers a brief section on 
Haldane’s uptake of dialectical materialism, the Marxist holistic philosophy, noting his 
use of it in the 1930s. Finally, it presents a few examples from Haldane’s post-World 
War II work to show continuity in his holistic outlook. To begin, I describe some key 
features shaping Haldane’s philosophical framework.
Haldane’s  Philosophical Commitments
Haldane’s philosophical commitments changed during his lifetime. One theme in 
those commitments involved a move from idealism to materialism. Another grew out 
of his frustration with the tension between mechanism and purpose in biology.
While an adolescent, J. B. S. was heavily influenced by his father, John Scott Haldane 
(Clark, 1968, pp. 17–19, 26–30; Werskey, 1988 [1978], pp. 53–60). J. S. Haldane 
(referred to herein as J. S. to distinguish father from son—J. B. S.) was a physiolo-
gist who promoted the application of neo-idealistic and antireductionist principles to 
biology, drawing from Kant and especially Hegel (Sturdy, 1988). However, as J. B. S. 
gained broader experiences, his commitments shifted in important ways.
J. B. S.’s participation in the Great War (World War I) challenged his neo-idealist pre-
conceptions and showed the need for something better grounded in experience. After 
witnessing a massacre of allied troops in 1915, for instance, J. B. S. reflected on Hegel’s 
conclusion that “the real is the rational.” This, J. B. S. suggested, “appeared to me to be 
refuted by the existing circumstances” (Haldane c. 1942, p. 14). Shortly after the war, 
J. B. S. also recalled developing serious doubts over the validity of Hegel’s “political 
tenets” (Haldane, 1995 [1923], p. 27). These doubts ebbed and flowed over the 
next decade. In the early 1920s, J. B. S. confidently predicted “Kantian idealism” 
would replace “materialism” as the “basal working hypothesis” for all human activi-
ties, beginning with science (Haldane, 1995 [1923], p. 27). By 1930, or around that 
time, J. B. S. referred to himself as “agnostic” regarding which side was correct, 
J. B. S. Haldane, Holism, and Synthesis in Evolution 51
though he admitted being “much attracted to a modified Hegelian view” (Haldane, 
1937b [1932], p. 169).
Importantly, Haldane also had developed some sympathy for materialism by 1930.6 
In 1923 he had accepted a senior post in biochemistry at the Dunn Laboratory, Uni-
versity of Cambridge. The head of the laboratory, the biochemist Frederick Gowland 
Hopkins, encouraged his staff to discuss the philosophical implications of biology, 
with his own brand of holistic materialism often being enthusiastically adopted by his 
fellow biochemists. An important component in these discussions was the still ongo-
ing debate among both philosophers and philosophically inclined scientists as to the 
implications of the “new physics” (i.e., quantum mechanics and relativity theory) for 
philosophy and science. Haldane showed a keen interest in both Hopkins’s material-
ism and its implications for biological research, and the new physics debate. This was 
also the period in which Haldane studied dialectical materialism, the Marxist holistic 
philosophy. Haldane synthesized these influences to create a materialist philosophical 
position in the early 1930s, certainly no later than 1933.7 He kept this position at least 
until 1950, when he left the Communist Party of Great Britain.
Haldane’s views after 1950 are as poorly understood as are his views prior to 1950. 
Several historians claim that, after his move to India in 1957, Haldane increasingly 
embraced Hinduism (Clark, 1968, p. 207; Dronamraju, 1985, pp. 8–9; Sarkar, 
1992b, pp. 404–405). At the same time, other evidence suggests Haldane still con-
sidered himself primarily a Marxist.8 More study is needed to understand how these 
views coexisted in Haldane’s overall commitments.
Throughout these struggles with idealism and materialism, Haldane remained 
a holist. His interest in the relationship between mechanism and purpose, and his 
struggle to find a solution to the debate between mechanists and vitalists, illustrates 
his approach.
As has been well studied, neo-idealism in the late nineteenth century arose in 
response to ardent materialism of previous decades. This in turn provoked a material-
ist response remembered thereafter (at least in biology) as a debate between mech-
anists and vitalists.9 Both sides equated mechanism with materialism, especially as 
mechanism related to physicochemical methods and explanations.
Vitalism was associated with idealism. Advocates included the embryologist Hans 
Driesch, the proponent of creative evolution Henri Bergson, the naturalist E. S. Rus-
sell, and J. B. S.’s father, J. S. Haldane. Idealistic vitalists stressed the importance of 
purposive activity within organisms (e.g., self-regulation, regeneration of lost limbs, and 
embryonic development). They argued purposive activity constituted a distinct kind of 
biological activity, one that could not be understood through an examination of com-
ponent parts and processes at all. Such investigations can only access physicochemical 
manifestations of purposive activity. For J. S. Haldane, these parts were subordinate to 
the intact organism functioning as a biological whole. Purpose had primacy.10
Mechanists emphasized the predictive success of physicochemical laws within biology. 
When they failed to account for features of complex systems, mechanists argued their 
laws should be supplemented or modified, rather than abandoned for an alternative 
metaphysics (Anonymous, 1906, 1914a, 1914b, 1916; E. H. S., 1917; Hardy, 1906).
When J. B. S. engaged the subject after the Great War, he took the view that both 
sides of this debate each had positive value, as well as valid criticisms. Still, a more 
encompassing solution was needed (and he was not alone in this conclusion).11
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Agreeing with mechanists (or materialists), Haldane argued, it came as no surprise 
that every process in living organisms obeyed the laws of physics and chemistry. On 
the other hand, and agreeing with idealistic vitalists, “these processes are coordinated 
in a way characteristic of the living organism. Thus, we cannot avoid speaking of the 
function of the heart, as well as its mechanism” (Haldane, 1932e [1927], p. 127). 
Neither side of this question deserved primacy, Haldane stressed, because the real 
question should be about their relationship (Haldane, 1932e [1927], pp. 127–129). 
Appealing to Kant, Haldane suggested mechanism and purpose might “cohere in one 
principle”—what Kant called “synthesis.” Even though “our reason cannot so unite 
them” now, he held out hope this would occur in the future (Haldane, 1932e [1927], 
p. 128). Haldane’s desire for synthesis separated him from his father, who insisted on 
the primacy of purpose.
Whole Organisms and Holistic Physiology
J. B. S.’s holism appeared in his first research, which involved experimental physiol-
ogy. Accepting a fellowship at New College, Oxford in 1919, Haldane began teach-
ing physiology. Respiration was the only part of the subject he knew well, so a crash 
course from his father kept J. B. S. ahead of his students (Pirie, 1966, p. 220). While 
in this position, J. B. S.’s scientific research was predominantly in physiology with 
occasional excursions into genetics.12
In the 1920s, J. B. S.’s physiological research followed in his father’s footsteps. J. 
S. started with an idealist epistemology, whereby causal relationships between physical 
and chemical observations are not the only causal relations that can be inferred legiti-
mately from scientific research. Of particular importance was J. S.’s idealist inference 
that a distinctive property of biological phenomena was a teleological coordination 
maintaining the normal functioning of the organism as a whole.
In experimental practice, J. S. focused on activities of whole, intact organisms. 
His work typically involved examining the rate at which whole organisms exchanged 
energy and substances with their environment. These exchanges were understood to 
be manifestations of the purposive activity of the organism in maintaining itself. The 
“laboratory” could be any location where J. S. could recreate living conditions that 
organisms might naturally encounter (Sturdy, 1987, pp. 201–220).
J. B. S. adopted J. S.’s research and epistemology (Clark, 1968, pp. 59–62, 135–
151). He studied organisms as intact wholes. He avoided severe disruption to the 
subject. His laboratory could be almost anywhere. He also regularly turned himself, 
and his research associates, into experimental subjects. Indeed, Joseph Needham’s 
earliest recollection of J. B. S. involved finding him staggering at the stairs to the bio-
chemistry department in the University of Cambridge. Haldane had been performing 
a physiological experiment on himself in which he was trying to ascertain the maxi-
mum safe dose of sodium bicarbonate (Mourant, 1968, pp. 319–320).
Although Haldane used a holistic method derived from his father’s application of 
neo-idealism to physiology, J. B. S. was not in full agreement with his father’s empha-
sis on purpose. J. B. S. also wanted to balance this with a place for mechanism (i.e., 
physicochemical pathways). Only the combination could lead him to a nonreductive 
cohering principle and produce the Kantian synthesis he desired.
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The Influence of Hopkins’s  Holistic Biochemistry
In 1923 Haldane left Oxford to become the first Sir William Dunn Reader in Bio-
chemistry at the University of Cambridge. It was here that Haldane encountered the 
philosophical and biochemical approach of Frederick Gowland Hopkins. This had a 
profound influence on Haldane.
Haldane’s Readership might seem unexpected given his training in physiology and 
not chemistry (Werskey, 1988 [1978], pp. 82–83). The explanation lies partly in the 
fact that biochemistry was not yet a separate discipline from physiology (Clark, 1968, 
p. 63). More directly, Haldane had abilities that would have appealed to Hopkins, 
and Hopkins made the key recruiting decision. From the reverse perspective, Cam-
bridge had a strong appeal for Haldane. Hopkins wanted biochemistry to study not 
only reactions in the whole body (rather than just the isolation and identification of 
chemical products) but also exact laws governing biological molecules. It also should 
produce increasingly exact experimental methods, and its exponents should have an 
interdisciplinary training. From his vantage point, Haldane could hardly find a more 
suitable environment. His physiological research met Hopkins’s first three aims; his 
broader interest in biology met the fourth (Sarkar, 1992a, pp. 56–60).
Haldane enthusiastically adopted Hopkins’s approach (Haldane: 1932c [1927], c. 
1933). Central were Hopkins’s concepts of dynamic equilibrium and levels of orga-
nization. In dynamic equilibrium, the organism persistently maintains itself against its 
external environment through the coordination of chemical reactions (particularly by 
the use of enzymes) and the distribution of necessary chemicals throughout the body.
A closely associated idea involved levels of organization. Levels included, for exam-
ple, individual cells, organs, and whole metazoan organisms. While holding properties 
in common with a lower level, entities at a higher level also exhibited additional prop-
erties characteristic of that higher level. For Hopkins this was not simply an aggrega-
tion of properties whilst ascending the levels. The properties or behavior of entities at 
lower levels were affected in part by those at higher levels. So he studied the interac-
tion of properties at different levels. For example, Hopkins stressed the importance of 
chemical coordination (organs coordinate cells; cells coordinate molecules). This kind 
of organization “illustrates that subservience of parts to the whole which characterises 
an organism” (Hopkins, 1932a, p. 870). Likewise in metazoans, “the cell has esoteric 
qualities which may call for organising influence of a greatly different kind, exerted 
maybe at some higher level” (Hopkins, 1932b, p. 16, my emphasis).13
Hopkins’s approach had philosophical appeal for Haldane in the 1920s. In the 
mechanism-vitalism debate, for instance, Haldane was unhappy with the solutions pro-
posed for the relationship between mechanism and purpose, and he sought a cohering 
principle. For Hopkins, levels of organization interacted such that wholes and parts 
partially determined the properties of each other. Though deliberately materialistic, 
this made purposive activity a property of whole organisms, and it meant that purpose 
could be determined both by certain physicochemical properties specific to whole 
organisms (e.g., self-maintenance) and by physicochemical interactions of the parts 
within the whole. This process-based antireductionism did not subsume purpose to 
mechanism, nor vice versa.
Also important for Haldane, Hopkins’s vision was not limited to the biological 
domain. Hopkins incorporated aspects of the work of philosopher Alfred North 
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Whitehead into his scheme. In the 1920s Whitehead argued the new ideas in quan-
tum mechanics demonstrated that all entities, both the living and the nonliving, were 
self-sustaining systems. In this sense, every entity could be understood as “organic”—
physical entities exhibiting a form of self-regulation or self-maintenance. For White-
head, this extended a biological concept into physics. For Hopkins, it offered a way 
to extend notions of levels of organization and dynamic equilibrium to much broader 
domains. Such a sweeping holistic vision certainly appealed to Haldane.14
Until now I have concentrated on the philosophical abstractions that Haldane 
would have found attractive in Hopkins’s biochemical vision. But it should be remem-
bered that Haldane learned his research techniques in biochemistry through the lens 
of Hopkins’s dynamic approach. Theory and practice would have acted to reinforce 
each other in Haldane’s eyes. A significant portion of his practical work entailed what 
became known as biochemical genetics.
Part of this work focused on the relationship between genes and enzymes. Haldane 
began this interest several years before his introduction to Hopkins’s philosophy of 
biology, but his approach significantly changed after his move to Cambridge. From 
1920 to 1927 the basis of Haldane’s work on the gene-enzyme relationship was that 
multiple alleles of a gene produced differing quantities of the same enzyme (and 
therefore differing intensities of the same trait) (Haldane, 1920, p. 10; 1922; 1927c). 
Thus, Haldane concluded, the relationship between alleles and enzymes was one of 
mechanistic aggregation of quantity.
It would be a mistake to assert that this conclusion marked Haldane as a mechani-
cal reductionist. During this period, Haldane took a proximate compromise familiar to 
many other geneticists, including T. H. Morgan and A. H. Sturtevant (Allen, 1978). 
Because so little was known about the nature of genes, it was necessary to treat them 
mechanistically until more basic information was collected (Haldane, 1927d, p. 456). 
(Also, this compromise would not have been a problem for the neo-Kantian Haldane 
of the mid-1920s, for whom mechanism could be useful in biology even though alone 
it was not sufficient.15) At the same time, Haldane kept a broader holistic vision as his 
ultimate goal. While chemical processes could be “taken one at a time . . . [and could] 
often be imitated by artificial means,” nonetheless “what is characteristic of life is not the 
individual details of structure or behaviour, but the way in which they cohere to form a self-
regulating and self-preserving whole” (Haldane, 1932b [1927], p. 45, my emphasis).
Interestingly, Haldane added a qualitative conception of allelomorphic series in an 
unpublished paper written around 1931. While in some cases a quantitative concep-
tion explained the data, in other cases “a series of multiple allelomorphs produce a 
series of different but closely related enzymes” (Haldane, c. 1931a, p. f 47). These 
created “qualitatively different specific substances” (Haldane, 1931a, p. f 65). In 
this case, the mechanistic side of Haldane’s theory of the gene gave way to a more 
dynamic, interacting process.
This shift was not trivial. In 1927, Haldane had an atomistic focus on the gene; in 
particular, a focus on gene products and the gene’s relation to a specific identifiable 
trait. By about 1931, he had shifted to classifying genes according to the biochemi-
cal functions they performed. In this case genes became part of more complex and 
dynamic developmental processes.16 This shift is evidenced further in Haldane’s claim 
that various authors showed “that a gene may alter the amount of an enzyme in a 
tissue, or at least the activity of the enzyme there found. But the amount of enzyme 
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may also vary rapidly through nongenetic causes” (Haldane, 1931a, p. f 43, my empha-
sis). Notably, “nongenetic causes” and “individual details” were not subsidiary agents 
compared with genes. This was a holist’s view.
One of the most important markers in Haldane’s more holistic approach to bio-
chemistry was his essay, “The Time of Action of Genes” (Haldane, 1932g). This 
attempted an ambitious synthesis of genetics, biochemistry, and embryology.17 As he 
did the year before, Haldane classified genes by their function, not their end product 
or trait. He also classified genes according to their time of action within the develop-
ing organism (sometimes even with other organisms [Haldane, 1932g, p. 6]). Using 
this approach, Haldane speculated on how the interplay between enzyme, gene, 
and environment affected developing organisms, and how changes in this interplay 
contributed to evolutionary change. For example, Haldane referred to the grow-
ing tadpole absorbing proportionately more water than salts from its environment. 
Thereafter, the concentration of salts within the tadpole decreases, and this affects 
enzyme activity (Haldane, 1932g, p. 20). According to Haldane, “This process will 
affect a whole group of enzymes (e.g., amylase, fumarase, and catalase) and have very 
little effect on others. Thus, a change in permeability [affecting water absorption] due 
to a single gene would affect the time of action of many others” (Haldane, 1932g, p. 
20). Since each enzyme may be used in “several quite separate processes,” a change 
to one gene can accelerate or retard the time of action of a whole group of enzymes 
(Haldane, 1932g, p. 20). Natural selection of such a gene could therefore result in 
several marked evolutionary changes in an organism.
Again, this discussion could be construed as part of a reductionistic argument for 
genetic control of organisms. However, within the context of Haldane’s holism, such 
biochemical explanations required context; for example, the demands on organisms 
related to environmental constraints and consequently the timing of gene action. Also, 
for Haldane, a gene would only constitute one detail within the biological whole. So 
“a change to one gene” would mean a change to one detail within the whole that 
happens to have a marked effect upon the whole (just as, in a similar manner as seen 
above, an enzyme could also be a detail producing a marked change in the whole).
In a series of lectures delivered in 1940, Haldane continued this approach to clas-
sifying genes by function and process rather than by a correlated trait. He now classi-
fied genes “by their chemical effect” (Haldane, 1941, p. 72) and spoke of the gene as 
“responsible for a unit process [for example, acidity, rather] than for a unit character” 
(Haldane, 1941, p. 21). He argued that functions of the genes were analogous to 
organ functions, leading to the strongly holistic claim, “We can regard the gene as 
an organ in the cell, just as the heart, pancreas, or femur is an organ in the body as a 
whole. Now in the last analysis the function of an organ depends on the other organs and 
the environment” (Haldane, 1941, p. 22, my emphasis).18
To summarize, Haldane’s scientific practice changed in the 1920s and early 1930s as 
he appropriated Hopkins’s conceptions of dynamic equilibrium and levels of organiza-
tions. These introduced Haldane to a different form of materialist philosophy and practice 
than the mechanistic variety he had previously considered. Its appeal was undoubtedly 
due, in part, to its potential for a unified picture of the world and its potential to unify 
biological disciplines in the sense of an intellectual, nonreductive synthesis. This can 
be seen in Haldane’s attempts at a synthesis of genetics with biochemistry. Even more 
striking was his synthesis of genetics, biochemistry, and embryology in “The Time of 
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Action of Genes” (1932g). Finally, Haldane used a mechanistic approach in the 1920s 
to consider the relationship between gene and enzyme. By his own admission, this was 
a limited, temporary approach. He discarded it in 1931 for a more holistic one. As will 
be seen, Haldane also used this compromise in later genetic work. Its provisional nature 
proves crucial to understanding Haldane as a geneticist.
Popul ation Genetics as a Synthesis  of Genetic 
and Ecological Mechanisms
As with his biochemical work, Haldane’s other genetics research moved from a mech-
anistic to a holistic context. The sequence of events and chronology were similar, 
with the transition around 1930 and with genetics playing a cooperative role in his 
synthesis for “Time of Action” (1932g). In this section, I examine Haldane’s early, 
predominantly mechanistic, approach to population genetics. This is followed by an 
examination of his synthesis of certain genetic mechanisms with ecological mecha-
nisms in 1930 and the place of this development in his article two years later, “Time 
of Action.” This section ends with a comparison of Haldane’s approach with Sewall 
Wright and R. A. Fisher, then comments on Ernst Mayr’s accusation that Haldane’s 
genetic work was merely “beanbag genetics.”
During the 1920s and 1930s Haldane gradually built up a body of work in popula-
tion genetics (Clark, 1968, pp. 29–31; Mitchison, 1968, p. 303; Pirie, 1966, p. 220; 
Werskey, 1988 [1978], pp. 57–58). Hailing from the Darwinist tradition at Oxford 
(Mayr, 1998 [1980], p. 11) and with a flair for mathematics, Haldane declared that 
the way forward for the Darwinist cause was to add mathematical rigor to Darwinian 
evolutionary theory (i.e., to use quantitative arguments in favor of natural selection as 
an explanation for evolution, rather than rely on purely descriptive arguments) (Hal-
dane, 1924a, p. 19). To this end, he began in 1924 a series of papers, “A Mathemati-
cal Theory of Natural and Artificial Selection.” In this series he devised mathematical 
models to examine the effect of different intensities of selection under various condi-
tions. He began with simple conditions that finally led to a “stable equilibrium” in the 
genetic composition of the population (Haldane, 1924a, 1924b). This was followed 
by cases resulting in no equilibrium, unstable equilibrium, or oscillations of the popu-
lation’s genetic composition (Haldane, 1926, 1927a, 1927b).
Shapiro correctly refers to these early papers in the “Mathematical Theory” series 
(papers 1 to 5, 1924–1927) as having “an unremittingly reductionistic [mechanistic] 
emphasis in the way the models are constructed” (Shapiro, 1993, p. 74). (He is not 
claiming these papers were exclusively reductionistic in emphasis.) Shapiro does not 
explain what he means by this “reductionistic emphasis,” but no doubt the following is 
his intended meaning. In each model, the population consists of a billiard ball universe 
of genes, or Mendelian factors. Once the conditions for the model have been obtained, 
the system will run in a mechanistically determined manner to its conclusion. This was 
as true for Haldane’s models of unstable and oscillating populations as for stable ones.
The mechanistic emphasis in Haldane’s early “Mathematical Theory” papers is 
unsurprising. This was a convenience. With very little previous work on this issue, 
Haldane argued, it was necessary to start with the simplest cases and then move on 
to the more complex (Haldane, 1924a, p. 19). As seen earlier, he made a similar 
compromise in his work on the gene-enzyme relationship during this time. From the 
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start of this series, Haldane stated his intention to use quantitative arguments in favor 
of natural selection as a feasible explanation for evolution, rather than rely on purely 
descriptive arguments.
After a gap of three years (1927–1930), Haldane returned to his “Mathematical 
Theory” series. In the intervening period he almost certainly met Sergei Chetverikov 
at the Fifth International Congress of Genetics in Berlin in 1927. Haldane was so 
enthusiastic about Chetverikov’s work, he apparently had the Russian works of the 
Chetverikov group translated into English and made available in his laboratory for 
his own coworkers (Adams, 1998 [1980], p. 268). Chetverikov and his group had 
already established a conjoining of biometrics, natural history, and genetics within 
a Darwinian framework (Adams, 1998 [1980], pp. 243, 262). Their synthesis of 
these elements was not intended to be reductionistic (Adams, 1998 [1980], pp. 246, 
248, 253). No doubt Haldane’s enthusiasm stemmed partly from his own desire to 
synthesize these same elements into a broader framework (Haldane, 1924a, p. 19). 
Whether Haldane gained any philosophical insight from the group’s work remains an 
open question. Regardless, their scientific work surely must have had an impact on the 
next phase of Haldane’s developing picture of population genetics. It helps explain, 
for instance, the incorporation of ecology.
The next three papers in Haldane’s “Mathematical Theory” series were produced 
almost simultaneously in 1930.19 These papers introduced a sense of internal dynam-
ics into populations, something missing from earlier “Mathematical Theory” papers. 
Populations were treated as a cluster of metastable (potentially unstable) populations 
and semi-isolated communities. This was the first occasion these two themes appeared 
in Haldane’s work. They constitute the genetic and ecological mechanisms, respec-
tively, in his developing picture of the processes of evolution. They also signal a move 
away from a narrowly mechanistic toward a more holistic approach—in other words, 
a synthesis of genetic and ecological aspects of evolution, rather than a reduction of 
one discipline to the other.
Regarding metastability, Haldane gave the example of a population containing 
genotype AABB with occasional mutations of A and B to a and b, respectively. Occa-
sionally, a section of this population becomes temporarily isolated from the main 
population (Haldane, 1931c, p. 138). The genotype aabb subsequently becomes the 
“stable type,” that is, the majority genotype of this semi-isolated community. When 
this community regains contact with the main population one of three outcomes is 
possible. Firstly, aabb becomes “swamped by hybridisation” with AABB. Secondly, 
“aabb may possess or develop characters which render meeting with AABB rare.” 
Thirdly, a species may exhibit “metastability” due to certain genetic mechanisms. In 
Haldane’s example,
chromosome changes may occur to cause close linkage of A and B when the populations 
are crossed. Thus if the loci of A and B are in the same chromosome an inversion of the 
portion containing them will lead to their behaving as a single factor on crossing. In this 
case if K [the viability of type aabb] is positive the whole species will be transformed into 
the type aabb. A species which is liable to transformations [due to genetic mechanisms] 
of this kind may be called metastable. Possibly metastability is quite a general phenom-
enon, but it is only rarely that the circumstances arise which favour a change of the type 
considered. (Haldane, 1931c, p. 139)
Descended from Darwin58
So Haldane strongly suspected many species (and populations) were metastable. 
A change in the genetic composition of species and populations was due as much 
to the internal nature of the species as it was to a change in environmental condi-
tions. In other words, the internal structure of the population (in this example, 
linkage possibilities) contains the potential for change. A change in the conditions 
(external factors) under which the population exists can allow this potential to be 
realized. This emphasis upon the nature of the internal differentiation of a species 
and its implications for evolutionary change was a distinct move away from the 
earlier mechanistic approach in the first five “Mathematical Theory” papers. It is 
worth recalling that this move toward a more systems-based, holistic model in his 
population genetics occurred in the same period as similar changes in Haldane’s 
biochemical work.20
Regarding ecological mechanisms, Haldane stated that evolutionary changes 
linked to metastability could only occur when “circumstances arise which favour” 
such a phenomenon. He suggested that these circumstances involved disturbances 
to a population resulting in semi-isolated communities. This phenomenon was par-
ticularly important in the evolution of higher animals (Haldane, 1932f, p. 103). In 
the “Mathematical Theory” papers, Haldane drew heavily on the zoologist G. P. Bid-
der’s notion of “cataclasms” for this ecological mechanism.21 Bidder used cataclasm 
to denote a nearly overwhelming catastrophe striking a species or population. The 
peculiar spelling was meant to avoid confusion with “cataclysm,” which Bidder took 
to mean “a widespread submergence of land” (Bidder, 1930, p. 783). Bidder argued 
cataclasms disrupted a population’s environment. In such cases, characteristics that 
are “normally useless” may suddenly become vital to survival (Bidder, 1930, p. 783). 
Periodic cataclasms, even separated by long intervals, could therefore result in wide-
spread distribution of such characteristics (Bidder, 1930, p. 783).22
Aside from the presence of useless characters for normal life, Bidder also noted 
two other effects of “cataclasmal selection.” First, organisms carrying cataclasmically 
advantageous characters may also carry over characters selected for a precataclasmic 
environment. Second, even “small quantitative differences may have survival value in 
a cataclasm” (Bidder, 1930, p. 784). From these considerations Bidder concluded 
that cataclasmal selection may “explain otherwise inexplicable characteristics” (such as 
the apparently useless ones mentioned above) (Bidder, 1930, p. 786).
In “Mathematical Theory” paper 7, Haldane introduced the idea that “the direc-
tion of selection [for certain genes] will be reversed” under certain circumstances 
(Haldane, 1931b, pp. 133–134). He went on to say,
This is in full accordance with the views of Bidder, who points out that, where “cata-
clasms” occasionally destroy the vast majority of a species, characters which are useless 
or worse under normal conditions may be selected. He specially mentions the case of a 
violent or erratic response of an animal by migration or otherwise to unfavourable envi-
ronments, which would be likely to lower the average viability, but increase its disper-
sion. (Haldane, 1931b, p. 135)
So Bidder’s scenario offered an explanation for why a character could switch from 
being disadvantageous to advantageous and why the direction of selection could be 
reversed.23 This was stated more explicitly in “Mathematical Theory” paper 8:
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Almost every species is, to a first approximation, in genetic equilibrium; that is to say no 
very drastic changes are occurring rapidly in its composition. It is a necessary condition 
for equilibrium that all new genes which arise at all frequently by mutation should be 
disadvantageous, otherwise they will spread through the population. Now each of two or 
more genes may be disadvantageous, but all together may be advantageous. An example 
of such balance has been given by Gonsalez (1). He found that, in purple-eyed Droso-
phila melanogaster, arc wing or axillary speck (each due to a recessive gene) shortened 
life, but the two together lengthened it. (Haldane, 1931c, p. 137)24
If Haldane noticed disagreements with Bidder’s theory, he chose not to state them 
(perhaps because this was a short mathematical paper). However, several differences 
are easily discernible. Haldane differed from Bidder in his synthesis of ecological with 
genetic factors. Also, where Bidder spoke of useless characters Haldane spoke of dis-
advantageous recurrent mutations. A cataclasmic disruption of a population could 
turn these mutations from being disadvantageous to advantageous to the organism. 
These mutations could then become the “stable type” in the semi-isolated commu-
nity suffering from the cataclasm. If this type was metastable it stood a far greater 
chance of becoming established in the parent population when reintroduced to it.
Haldane pursued similar themes in his synthetic 1932 paper “Time of Action,” 
where he produced further arguments for processes that could lead to the “sudden 
appearance” of ancestral characters, the eruption of “violent evolutionary novelties,” 
“apparently useless evolution,” or even interspecific differences and therefore specia-
tion events (Haldane, 1932g, pp. 15–17, 20).
This is the context for comparing Haldane’s work to that of Fisher and Wright. A 
detailed analysis is not possible here. I simply will suggest one potential starting point, 
focusing on the place of ecology in each of their respective schemes. Philosophically, 
Fisher’s approach to population genetics was atomistic and strictly selectionist within 
panmictic populations (Hodge, 1992, pp. 247–253). Scientifically, his ecological pic-
ture was derived through his ongoing association with Edmund Brisco Ford.
Wright was a holist (Provine, 1986, p. 235) though his population genetics did 
not have an ecological aspect. His adaptive landscapes had the appearance of adding 
an ecological dimension to his theory, but they had only a limited applicability to 
natural populations (Provine, 1986, pp. 307–317). It was not so much his holism that 
constrained his vision as his science. In the early 1930s Wright was known as an ani-
mal breeder, physiological geneticist, and increasingly as a quantitative evolutionary 
theorist. Although he was aware of current theory in natural history and systematics 
this contained a bewildering number of explanations or mechanisms for variations 
between closely allied species (Provine, 1986, pp. 291–297; Cain, 1993, pp. 3, 17). 
For some reason, Wright failed to choose between them.
Haldane’s population genetics differed from Fisher and Wright in that he had a 
holistic view and an ecological mechanism. In common with Wright, he thought 
Fisher’s model had limited applicability to evolutionary processes and semi-isolated 
communities played an important role. Unlike Wright, Haldane had a substantive 
ecological mechanism, drawing on Bidder’s cataclasms. Perhaps Haldane’s decisive 
stance on an ecological mechanism was in part due to the influence of Chetverikov.
Ernst Mayr’s famous dismissal of mathematical population genetics as “beanbag 
genetics” (Mayr, 1959) deserves special comment. Haldane’s approach certainly did 
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not fit Mayr’s representation of an overly simplistic discipline ignoring broader biologi-
cal contexts. Haldane (1964) made this point, and continued to argue for a multifac-
eted approach to biology in which genetics played a nonreductive role. He also argued 
for using mathematics as a nonreductive tool for understanding biological processes.
A Home in Dialectical Materialism
During the period of Haldane’s intellectual synthesis of the early 1930s, he was also 
undertaking a rigorous study of dialectical materialism.25 Hopkins’s materialist pro-
gram had helped to show Haldane that it was possible to be a materialist and a holistic 
scientist. Dialectical materialism gave Haldane a wider ranging set of unifying prin-
ciples with which to investigate and explain the world. He was particularly excited 
by the possibilities of the materialist dialectic as expressed in the law of the unity of 
opposites (Hammond, 2004, pp. 84–91). This principle appeared to be the primary 
driving force behind all processes—a strong unifying principle indeed!
Haldane certainly was attempting to apply dialectical materialism to his philosophi-
cal concerns no later than 1933. In “Quantum Mechanics as a Basis for Philosophy,” 
published in January 1934, he proposed a solution to the mind-body problem that 
was not just holistic but also dialectical materialist in perspective (Hammond, 2004, 
pp. 87–91). The scientific research implications from this model were obvious (even 
if not practically possible at the time).
Traces of the dialectical materialist approach in Haldane’s scientific work may be 
found in his “Mathematical Theory” series as early as 1930 (Hammond, 2004, pp. 
133–135). His first mature application to his science probably came in his mutation-se-
lection model of 1935 (Haldane, 1935). This model led to a research program extended 
at least to 1940 (Haldane, 1939a; Haldane, 1939b, 1940; Haldane & Moshinsky, 
1939; Hammond, 2004, pp. 115–128).26 He also promoted the application of Marxist 
holism to science through such works as “A Dialectical Account of Evolution” (Hal-
dane, 1937f) and The Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences (Haldane, 1939c).
Haldane’s  Holism After 1945
After 1945, Haldane’s scientific output appears overwhelmingly genetic in character. 
Yet he was not pursuing a reductionist program. He had hoped to continue his bio-
chemical work upon acceptance of a full-time post at University College London in 
1937, and he was expected to do so. But shortly after his appointment World War II 
disrupted his work at the university, and in the immediate aftermath of the war facili-
ties and funding were severely limited in Britain (Clark, 1968, pp. 93). He had to be 
realistic. Also, his biochemical research program had run its course. In typical Haldane 
fashion, he had quickly passed onto other possibilities and left remaining issues for 
other researchers (Darlington, 1966, p. 5; Darlington, 1968; Sarkar, 1992a, p. 75).
When Haldane spoke at the famous 1947 Princeton conference on “Genetics, 
Paleontology, and Evolution,” he stressed the need for a holistic understanding of 
evolutionary processes, introducing his paper with a profound comment:
Only evil can come from forgetting that man must be considered from many angles. . . . 
You can treat him as a thinker, as an individual, as a member of society, as a being capable 
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of moral choice, as a creator and appreciator of beauty, and so on. Concentration on 
only one of these aspects is disastrous . . . any attempt to reduce ethics and politics to 
biology . . . [will result in] . . . a moral degradation [as happened in Hitler’s Germany]. 
(Haldane, 1949b, p. 405)
This paper was a pluralistic romp through the history of humanity and its pos-
sible future. With the exception of Muller’s summary to the conference, all the other 
authors in this conference focused narrowly on parts of the wider picture, reflecting 
the postwar differentiation of professional concerns.
In “Disease and Evolution” (1949a), Haldane suggested disease acted as a positive 
agent in evolution. Intrinsic to his argument was the group (and species) as a unit of 
selection. These units constituted nonreductive levels of organization. The concepts 
in this paper can in part be traced from previously existing elements in Haldane’s 
intellectual makeup, including the negation of the negation from dialectical material-
ism (Hammond, 2004, pp. 135–140).
Haldane continued to promote a version of nonreductive levels of organization as 
part of an explanation for multifarious aspects of reality in “Time in Biology” (1956). 
To this end he classified various processes according to their timescale, acknowledg-
ing a debt to Joseph Needham’s concept of “integrative levels of organization.” This 
Needham based, at least in part, on Marxist holism (Needham, 1976 [1937]).27 In 
this paper, Haldane also continued to insist cell constituents—for example, proteins—
were not alive but merely “details” within the cell as a living whole. He linked this 
argument to ideas expressed by Friedrich Engels (Haldane, 1956, pp. 389–391). Hal-
dane included DNA in this holistic list of “details.”
A final example involves Haldane’s attempts to distinguish living from nonliving 
entities. Haldane always admitted our present level of knowledge made it impossible 
to give a complete definition of this distinction. Still, we can make a start. In his 1930s 
Marxist writings, Haldane applied the concept of “quantal events” to the structure 
of the cell. He suggested that whole cells may have a unity similar to that found in 
a molecule with “a system of energy levels peculiar to the cell as a whole, just as the 
molecule has systems of energy levels which do not belong to any of its constituent 
atoms, and yet are not imposed upon it from outside” (Haldane, 1939c, p. 105).28 
Haldane was arguing that while there is a material continuity between the living and 
nonliving, there is an energy level discontinuity—a dialectically qualitative distinction 
between organisms and inanimate objects. It is also significant that he emphasized this 
qualitative distinction was not imposed upon the organism or system from outside, 
but was due to the nature of the entity itself (i.e., the properties arise due to the inter-
nal organization of the system or whole). He was still promoting this holistic concept 
in his last years (Haldane, 1963).
Conclusion
Throughout his life Haldane was a holist. In his philosophical development, shifts in his 
position were from one holism to another. At no stage did he consider that mechanism 
alone could hold the key to a unified picture of biology. It was useful but not sufficient.
Haldane attempted to incorporate his specialized interests into an increasingly 
broader, holistic picture. This is particularly important in the early 1930s, a robust period 
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of intellectual synthesis for him. Haldane entered this period with an established holistic 
approach to physiology. In his biochemical genetics, he moved from an “atomistic” to a 
developmental (and holistic) approach in approximately 1931. His work in population 
genetics expanded from a narrowly mechanistic approach to one that included ecologi-
cal aspects inspired by Bidder and almost certainly Chetverikov by 1930. In his paper 
“Time of Action” (1932), he attempted a synthesis involving genetics, biochemistry, 
and embryology. These developments were partly influenced by Haldane’s move from 
a hesitant support for idealistic holism to an acceptance of materialistic holism, finally in 
the form of dialectical materialism. Both Hopkins’s holistic materialism and dialectical 
materialism played a role in Haldane’s intellectual synthesis.
Notes
 1. For all his quantitative work, Haldane should nonetheless be treated as a biologist, not a 
mathematician. He regarded mathematics as an important servant of biology, a tool to be 
used to achieve the ends of biological inquiry (Haldane, 1937d [1932]; 1956, p. 398; 1964, 
pp. 7–8). Note that all citations of Haldane are to the works of J. B. S. Haldane, unless indi-
cated otherwise.
 2. Principal biographical sources on Haldane are still Clark (1968), Dronamraju (1985), and 
Pirie (1966).
 3. Even the Haldane Archives at the National Library of Scotland and University College Lon-
don are not much help when studying his broader scientific or philosophical thinking. Few 
reflective discussions are preserved there.
 4. Originally coined in 1926, holism referred to one particular style of antimechanism (Han-
cock, 1962, pp. 304–306; Kerr, 1927). This original use was rejected by Haldane, among 
others (Haldane, 1937c [1932], p. 246; Needham, 1931, pp. 30–32). For a study of its 
different uses by historians see Lawrence and Weisz (1998). Broadly construed, holism is a 
species of antireductionism that insists the whole is greater, in some sense, than the sum of its 
parts. Here, I use the term in its broadest sense to indicate an antireductionism that is not just 
in opposition to a reductionist program, but also proposes a positive alternative.
 5. For further hints see comments on Haldane’s fusion of biochemistry and genetics (Caspari, 
1968, p. 43); his synthesis of findings from various biological disciplines (Wright, 1968, pp. 
1, 3); his multilevel thinking (Pirie, 1968, p. 257); and Dronamraju’s general claim that Hal-
dane was “a great synthesizer” (Dronamraju, 1968, p. vii).
 6. For Haldane’s increasing sympathy to materialism, see Haldane (1937c [1932], pp. 247–249; 
1937b [1932]; 1937e [1932], pp. 155–156; also discussed in Hammond [2004, pp. 73–91] 
and differently by Sarkar [1992b, pp. 394–396]).
 7. Other authors have assumed that Haldane accepted dialectical materialism at the time of his 
political conversion to Marxism in 1937 (Sarkar, 1992b, pp. 398–399; Shapiro, 1993). I 
argue it occurred before 1937 (Hammond, 2004, pp. 79–91).
 8. A striking example is Haldane’s explanation near the end of his life for writing a poem about 
the rectal carcinoma that would finally kill him: “I am a good enough Marxist to think that 
every poem should have a social function, though not a good enough one to think that it must. 
The main functions of my rhyme . . . [are to] . . . induce cancer patients to be operated on early 
and to be cheerful about it” (Haldane, as quoted in Clark, 1968, p. 258; see also Haldane, 
1961, p. 32). On his confusion: “A few centuries of Stalinism or technocracy might be a cheap 
price to pay for the unification of mankind” (Haldane, as quoted in Adams, 2000, p. 487).
 9. The ensuing comments apply only to the English variant of this debate and derive, in large 
measure, from exchanges in Nature. See Hammond (2004, pp. 56–63, 71–79).
 10. The terminology describing antireductionist positions in this period varies widely. J. S. Hal-
dane denied being a vitalist, associating this term with those who proposed a distinct vital sub-
stance, and referred to his own position as “organicism.” For my purposes, I refer to J. S. as 
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a “vitalist” because he insisted on a distinct biological category that could not be investigated 
by physicochemical means. For short accounts of J. S.’s position, see J. S. Haldane (1908); 
Anonymous (1919). For a detailed analysis see Sturdy (1987, 1988).
 11. Among others who developed an antireductionist and antivitalist program were Joseph Need-
ham, the embryologist and philosopher of biology Joseph Henry Woodger, and Conrad Hal 
Waddington. On Needham and Woodger see Abir-Am (1987); Haraway (1976, pp. 101–
146); Yoxen (1986, pp. 316–318). On Needham see Abir-Am (1991) and Needham (1932). 
On Woodger see Woodger (1929; 1930, pp. 1–22) and Yoxen (1986, pp. 314–315); on 
Waddington see Waddington (1929; 1931) and Yoxen (1986).
 12. From as early as eight years old J. B. S. was directly involved in his father’s physiological 
experiments. The only other period in which J. B. S. performed physiological research was 
during World War II. For accounts of J. B. S.’s physiological work, see Clark (1968, pp. 
17–19, 27–29, 58–62, 135–151); Dronamraju (1968); Haldane (1932d, 1927); Pirie (1966, 
pp. 234–235); and for J. B. S. on J. S.’s physiological work, see Haldane (1961).
 13. On Hopkins as holist see Kamminga and Weatherall (1996). Although the quotes used are 
not from Hopkins’s pronouncements in the 1920s, when Haldane learned how to do Hop-
kins’ biochemistry, I have chosen them for their concision. They illustrate aspects of Hop-
kins’ position that remained fairly constant in the 1920s and 1930s. For useful summaries of 
Hopkins’ position see Hopkins (1949c [1927] and 1949b [1936]; see also Hopkins, 1931, 
1932a, 1932b, 1949a [1932], 1933a, and 1933b).
 14. Other philosophically inclined biologists of the 1920s were also interested in Whitehead’s 
ideas. This included Haldane’s associates the evolutionist Conrad Hal Waddington and the 
embryologist Joseph Needham (Needham, 1931, p. 29; Needham, 1943b; 1941; Wad-
dington, 1929; Waddington, 1975, p. viii). Joseph Woodger was also inspired by Whitehead 
(Woodger, 1930, p. 7). Ambiguity in Whitehead’s writings also allowed the vitalists who 
opposed Hopkins’s views to claim the former as support for their own position (for example, 
Russell, 1934, pp. 835–837).
 15. This was also true for Haldane later on. See Haldane (1941, p. 43; 1948, p. 3).
 16. This is not to say Haldane omitted biochemical arguments in his studies of allelomorphic series 
prior to 1931. In 1927 he used a biochemical argument to support the quantitative concept of 
allelomorphic series. He suggested certain work by Wright could be explained by the biochemi-
cal environment of allelomorphs constraining their activity—strictly speaking, the activity of 
enzymes as the primary products of these allelomorphs (Haldane, 1927c, p. 201). However, 
this biochemical argument was used within the atomistic context of the question of the quantity 
of primary product (that is, enzyme) being “produced” from the allele. In a similar manner, 
Haldane argued that Fisher’s theory of dominance could only apply to a limited number of cases 
(Haldane, 1930b). Haldane appears to have discarded this particular criticism of Fisher’s theory 
after 1930, about the same time he dispensed with his atomistic approach in general.
 17. On the latter, he acknowledged a debt to Gavin de Beer’s Embryology and Evolution (1930) 
(Haldane, 1932g, p. 16). Haldane’s interest in embryology certainly predated 1932. He must 
surely have discussed it with his associates and embryological researchers Joseph Needham 
and Conrad Hal Waddington (for examples of the interconnections between the three sci-
entists on embryology see Haldane (1941, p. 197) and Yoxen (1986, pp. 313–315). Others 
were also interested in the issue of gene action in the early 1930s, but few had ideas on the 
topic with the level of sophistication found in Haldane’s paper (Allen, 1978, pp. 298–301; 
Keller, 2000, pp. 75–76; Provine, 1986, pp. 301–302; Wright, 1934; Zeleny, 1933).
 18. Haldane had been using the analogy of the gene as an organ from at least 1920 (Haldane, 
1920, p. 8; Hammond, 2004, p. 167), but this is possibly the clearest exposition of its mean-
ing for him.
 19. Mathematical Theory paper 6 was “Received 12 February, read 24 February, 1930” (Haldane, 
1930a, p. 220). Mathematical Theory paper 7 was “Received 12 November, read 8 December, 
1930” (Haldane, 1931b, p. 131). Mathematical Theory paper 8 was “Received 20 November, 
read 8 December, 1930” (Haldane, 1931c, p. 137). All emphases are in the originals.
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 20. Further evidence for Haldane’s mechanistic approach to genetics in the 1920s being a short-
term tactic was his awareness during this period of the need to move to considerations of the 
internal differentiation of these entities: “Just as the internal structure of atoms was elucidated 
by physicists rather than chemists, it is probable that the inner nature of the gene is a problem 
for the biochemist rather than the geneticist . . . how the genes cooperate in development, 
is analogous to the problem of how atoms cooperate in a molecule” (Haldane, 1927d, p. 
456).
 21. Haldane’s account of Bidder’s cataclasms was based on the version found in Nature of Bid-
der’s paper read to the Linnaen Society (Bidder, 1930; Haldane, 1931b, p. 135). There is 
evidence that other holists among Haldane’s close colleagues were interested in Bidder’s 
theory, such as J. D. Bernal and Joseph Needham (Bernal, not dated). Haldane also attributed 
a similar ecological argument to Ridley (1905) concerning plants and Elton (1927) for animal 
species (Haldane, 1932f, pp. 118–119).
 22. Bidder’s example of a cataclasm concerned sponges living in the littoral zone (the coastal area 
between high and low tides). Haldane referred to floods sweeping “large numbers of normal-
eyed aquatic animals into a cave where the majority are blind” (Haldane, 1930a, p. 229; see 
also Haldane, 1932f, pp. 117–118).
 23. This was also the first occasion, based on Bidder’s theory, that Haldane felt there was an 
explanation for apparently nonadaptive features, for “apparently useless characters which nev-
ertheless have been selected for their own sakes, for an entirely different reason” (Haldane, 
1932f, p. 117).
 24. In The Causes of Evolution, Haldane again mentioned how “two genes one at a time produce 
a disadvantageous type, but taken together are useful” (Haldane, 1932f, p. 100) and “Gon-
zalez” work was the example again.
 25. I use the term “dialectical materialism” because it is still the best phrase to express the Marx-
ist philosophy espoused by Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, and Leon Trotsky. 
The term has a history before and after the Stalinist era and should not be conflated with the 
Stalinist “diamat” (see Rée, 1984, pp. 2–3, 134–135n6; and Sewell & Woods, 1983). The 
degree to which Haldane’s early usage of dialectical materialism may have been influenced by 
Stalinized “Leninism” requires further investigation.
 26. See also Bell and Haldane (1937) and Haldane (1938, pp. 73–74).
 27. On Needham’s partial adoption of dialectical materialism, see Blue (1998).
 28. His first use of this concept was in his dialectical materialist model of the phenomenon of 
mind (Haldane, 1934, pp. 87–88).
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